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THE RENEGOTIATION OF CHINESE CULTURAL IDENTITY 
IN THE POST-MAO ERA* 
 
James L. Watson  
Fairbank Professor of Chinese Society and 
Professor of Anthropology, Harvard University 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In this lecture I will be focusing on a question that has dominated Chinese politics since the May 
4th movement and probably much earlier: what is it that constitutes the true essence of Chinese 
cultural identity? 
 
Today in the aftermath of the Beijing massacre this question has taken on a special urgency. 
Many younger Chinese of my acquaintance have come to the depressing, nihilistic conclusion 
that the aging autocrats of Zhongnanhai may represent the core of China's traditional culture. If 
so, they argue, it is time to start all over again and build an entirely new culture. On Taiwan, 
opposition leaders are forcing large numbers of people to reexamine their own cultural identity - 
can one be 'Chinese' and also 'Taiwanese'? What about the long-suffering residents of Hong 
Kong? In what sense are the citizens of this territory 'Chinese'? What, if anything, do all of these 
people share? How should one define 'Chineseness' in the post-modern, post-socialist, post-CNN 
world? 
 
This is, of course, an absurdly ambitious topic for a fieldworking anthropologist to address, 
especially someone who is most comfortable in villages - far from the centers of power. One 
might also ask what an American-born, Caucasian outsider is doing holding forth on the subject 
of 'Chineseness'? This is not an unfair criticism: questions regarding the personal background of 
fieldworkers have influenced American anthropology in a big way of late, causing great angst 
among younger scholars: how does one represent the 'other', namely those who live in other 
societies, 
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other times, or other cultures? 
 
These questions relate to the age-old debates regarding insider versus outsider perspectives, or 
emic versus etic in the jargon of anthropology. Twenty years ago it was taken as an article of 
faith among anthropologists that the outsider had certain methodological advantages, but this 
received wisdom has been subjected to intensive attack in recent years. 
 
Anthropologists have also come under the influence (some would say the pall) of post-modernist 
critical studies in American academe - beginning with the spillover from Edward Said's classic 
study, Orientalism, and continuing with an avalanche of studies that challenge the 'authority' of 
anthropologists (or any scholars) to adequately represent those of other cultures. 
 
So, I stand here today in a state of angst. This is perhaps appropriate given that I am concerned 
with a culture that is also, rather obviously, in a state of angst. I want, therefore, to make clear 
that I speak as an outsider and I make no claims to privileged insight. 
 
We will begin with the political drama of Tiananmen Square, the Spring Democracy Movement 
of 1989. I was not there, in body, but I was 'there', spiritually, along with millions of other 
Americans, riveted to my TV screen, watching the live broadcasts on CNN (Cable News 
Network). The television images of Chinese students demonstrating in Beijing were so 
electrifying that they gave viewers the vicarious thrill of participating in a momentous historical 
'event'. The Tiananmen demonstrations will no doubt be recognized by future historians as the 
crowning moment in the post-modern era of the late 20th century. 
 
The live broadcasts were multivariant in their symbolism - and irony. Twenty-two years earlier 
the same square was the venue for another set of demonstrations representing the Red Guard 
generation. The goals and public rhetoric of the two historical movements were radically 
different but one important symbol remained constant: the enigmatic portrait of Mao Zedong still 
looms over the square. When vandals attacked the portrait on 23 May 1989, students reacted 
with anger and expressed great concern that this act might be used as a pretext for troops to clear 
the square. Said one, 'Mao was a good guy. There was no need to abuse him like that' (New York 
Times, 24 May 1989). 
 
Here, in the heat of a political movement, we witness the process by which history is 
reconstructed. For many Chinese that same image conjures up unpleasant memories of the 
Cultural Revolution. During my first trip to China in the late 1970s, Mao's portrait was 
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everywhere. Today, aside from Tiananmen Square, one is hard pressed to find depictions of Mao 
displayed in public. Two gigantic statues of Mao were removed from the campus of Peking 
University only 12 months prior to the spring demonstrations (for a description of the demolition 
see the Far Eastern Economic Review, 17 November 1988). The statues had become an 
embarrassment for a generation of teachers and administrators who had participated - some as 
persecutors, others as 'bad class' victims - in the Cultural Revolution. On 23 May 1989, however, 
a new generation of students too young to remember the 1960s had appropriated the memory of 
Mao for their own purposes. He had been transformed into a symbol of selflessness and rectitude 
in an era characterized by corruption, alienation, and self doubt. One wonders whether this 
reinterpretation of Mao as an emblem of protest will be pursued and developed by future leaders. 
Stranger things have happened in the representation of public personalities since 1949. 
 
The public sufferings of the hunger strikers (jueshizhe) was another powerful image that 
television made immediate and tangible. And this, of course, is precisely the point: fasting is a 
political act that conveys an unmistakable message to the world at large. In fact, given their 
expectation that the state-controlled media in China would deny them access to the Chinese 
people, it seems likely that the Beijing students chose consciously to appeal to an international 
television audience. The news of young people courting death through fast could then be sent 
back to China, literally over the heads of party authorities, by the VOA and BBC. As it turned 
out both Chinese print media and, to a limited extent, local television broadcast the news of the 
hunger strike. (See also the extraordinarily detailed and sympathetic account of the student 
movement in the 29 May 89 issue of Beijing Review, vol. 32, no. 22.) But there can be little 
doubt that satellite broadcasts of the fasting, complete with howling sirens and fainting students, 
by CNN, CBS, and other foreign networks had much to do with the creation of an international 
media event - which, in turn, helped student leaders convert the small-scale demonstrations into 
China's most serious political crisis since the death of Mao and the subsequent arrest of the Gang 
of Four in 1976. 
 
 
Foreign Symbols in a Chinese Political Drama 
 
But why fasting? Why did Beijing students choose a form of political protest that is essentially 
foreign? There are, of course, parallels in Chinese history. During the Ming-Qing transition an 
exemplary official, Liu Zongzhou (1578-1645), fasted for 20 days, killing himself to protest the 
rise of Manchu authority. The Shiji records two legendary heroes of the Zhou dynasty, Boyi and 
Shuqi, who starved to death in a protest against political injustice.1 In more modern times, 
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however, hunger strikes have not been a central feature of the Chinese cultural repertoire. 
According to Chinese colleagues, there were few celebrated precedents during the May 4th 
Movement, the anti-Japanese protests, or the civil war era. Fasting plays a central role in the 
modern political history of Korea (Kim Kwang-ok, personal communication) but not, apparently, 
in China. (But see Hinton 1972:91 for hunger striking as a political tactic during the Cultural 
Revolution; there have also been reports of hunger strikes among Shanghai textile workers in the 
1930s. I am grateful to Paul Cohen and Elizabeth Perry for this information.)  
 
Judging from the visual images and from the verbal messages conveyed by students in the 
square, it seems likely that the cultural models for the Beijing actions were Ghandi's anti-
imperialist fasts and the hunger strikes associated with the Korean student protests - both of 
which are often depicted in the Chinese media. I will return to the question of foreign symbols 
and Chinese cultural identity in the conclusion of this talk. 
 
Few who have lived or worked in China during the past five or six years can fail to notice the 
high level of alienation and despair that characterizes intellectual life, even prior to the 1989 
crackdown. This is partly a consequence of frozen salaries and rising inflation. Meanwhile, the 
entire society seems to have plunged headlong into the pursuit of personal affluence. 
Intellectuals have had to join the scramble for new sources of income (e.g. by marketing their 
foreign language and management skills) or stand aside and watch their standard of living fall 
below that of workers with minimal education. Financial problems are obviously important but 
teachers, writers, and researchers are also deeply concerned about the evolution of Chinese 
culture in the post-Mao era. The self-sacrificing ethic of the early communist movement (1949-
57) appealed to many intellectuals who participated in the construction of a new socialist culture. 
Having seen these dreams shattered during the late 1950s and 1960s they had high hopes for the 
reforms instituted in the late 1970s. After 10 years of reform, however, there is still no agreement 
on what kind of society China is to become. The communist party has lost credibility and its 
leaders are incapable of enlisting mass support for a new vision of the future. Equally alarming 
to many intellectuals is the prospect that China has abandoned its past in an effort to join the 
modern world. 
 
It is unclear whether ordinary Chinese workers and farmers share the intellectuals' sense of 
despair about the future or the present. In my own research (1985, 1986, 1988) among rural 
peoples of Guangdong and Jiangsu quite the opposite impression emerged, namely that farmers 
were delighted with the economic reforms. It is true, of course, that my field work has 
concentrated in two of China's wealthiest areas (the Pearl River Delta and the Jiangnan region); 
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the same sense of buoyancy may not prevail in the North China Plain. 
 
In the past, prior to the reforms, to be sent to the countryside was equated with lifelong exile and 
poverty. Today, ironically, certain rural areas (e.g. Guangdong's Zhongshan and Xinhui Xian) 
are attracting illegal migrants from northern cities; these itinerants do not speak Cantonese and 
work for wages that no self-respecting Guangdong farmer would even consider accepting. In 
some parts of China, therefore, the countryside is losing its stigmatized image. 
 
It seems possible that two, separate cultural systems may be emerging, one in the cities and 
another in the countryside. Before pursuing this proposition, however, more needs to be said 
about the nature of cultural identity in Chinese society. 
 
In my opening statement I asked: in what sense is post-Mao Chinese culture 'Chinese?' Today I 
intend to examine the question from an anthropological perspective. 'Culture' in this context is 
not a reflection (exclusively) of the arts, literature, and philosophy. Rather, the term culture as 
employed here is intimately related to perceptions of appropriate lifestyle - this, in turn, is 
incorporated into one's sense of personal identity. Culture is embedded in family patterns, 
religious beliefs, political attitudes, and in the rituals of everyday life. Furthermore, culture, like 
one's sense of identity, is constantly changing. 
 
Contemporary definitions of culture have been adapted to fit the fluid, boundary-defying 
expectations of the post-modern world. Most anthropologists now see culture as a set of 
symbolic representations and expectations that people must construct for themselves.2 It is no 
longer perceived as a list of traits inherited passively from ancestors in preordained or immutable 
form, as earlier Tylorian notions would lead us to expect (see Hatch 1973:20-4). Culture in 
today's world has to be negotiated, transacted, and achieved. This approach thus stresses the 
active participation of people who cooperate - some willingly, others not - to create an 
acceptable culture. State authorities are, of course, directly involved in this creative process but, 
in the end, it is the acceptance and routinization of cultural forms by ordinary people that matters 
most. 
 
Since 1949 the Chinese people have experienced two or three traumatic attempts to destroy key 
elements of their 'traditional' (i.e. presocialist) culture. Closely associated with these movements 
have been state-sponsored campaigns to construct competing versions of a new socialist culture - 
the most notable being the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution launched in 1966. An earlier 
and in some respects more far-reaching campaign to obliterate the old and fabricate the new 
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occurred during the Great Leap Forward (1958-60). If anything was made clear by these 
movements it was that China's presocialist culture was, and to a certain extent still is, a very hard 
nut to crack. 
 
 
Cultural Identity in Late Imperial and Republican Era China  
 
In comparison to other premodern, agrarian societies there can be little doubt that late imperial 
China exhibited a high degree of cultural integration. Serious divisions based on kinship, 
ethnicity, and regional loyalties did, of course, exist in China but - unlike Europe or South Asia - 
the dominant historical theme is one of ever increasing incorporation and cooptation. One need 
only read Eugen Weber's Peasants into Frenchmen (1976) to appreciate just how integrated 
China was during its late imperial era. Weber's account of the period immediately preceding 
World War I (1870-1914) makes it clear that the idea of 'France' as a modern nation state, with a 
shared culture and a corporate identity that tied all citizens together, did not exist until it was 
consciously created by Parisian social engineers for the purposes of national mobilization. 
Benedict Anderson's speculations on the origins of modern nationalism (1983) are also relevant 
here: the Chinese at the turn of the 20th century could not 'imagine' the state as an integral part of 
their personal identity but they had no difficulty identifying with the abstraction we might call 
'Chinese civilization'. 
 
In China the notion of a unified culture predated, and made possible, the fabrication of a modern 
Chinese state following the collapse of the imperial order in 1911. People of all stations in life - 
peasants, workers, landlords, merchants, officials - already related to China's grand tradition with 
its ancient history. For ordinary Chinese this abstraction was concretized and represented in 
everyday discourse as the 'civilized' or appropriate way of life; those who did not follow 
accepted norms were defined as 'uncivilized' (meiwenhuade, yehmande). Notions of civility, 
conformity, and order are thus at the heart of what all Chinese accepted as the irreducible basis 
of their cultural identity. The point I wish to emphasize is that the vast majority of Chinese, 
irrespective of class background, life experience, or education shared this vision of the 
acceptable way of life during the late imperial era (there were, of course, dissenters, such as the 
Taiping rebels and members of various Daoist sects). The notion of a shared culture began to 
unravel during the late 19th and early 20th centuries, culminating in the May 4th Movement, but 
this idea of corporate identity survived for most people until the political campaigns of the 
communist era. 
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How does one explain the development of a shared culture on such a grand scale? Some have 
stressed the role of an ideographic3 (i.e. non-phonetic) script that cuts across speech 
communities, thereby allowing educated people from different regions to share a common 
literary/philosophical tradition (see e.g. Ho 1976:551-4). Others have argued that it was the auto-
cratic power of the Chinese state, projected through a complex bureaucracy, that held the society 
together (e.g. Wittfogel 1957). Still others point to China's elaborate hierarchy of commercial 
centers and marketing communities as the key to cultural unity (Skinner 1985). All of these 
explanations are, of course, correct. One cannot conceive of 'China,' or the abstraction we call 
Chinese culture, without a common script, a centralized state, and a complex hierarchy of central 
places. 
 
My own approach to the problem of cultural identity is rather more down to earth and stresses 
two interrelated features of everyday life: (1) a shared oral tradition, and (2) the central role of 
ritual. During the late imperial era everyone - from the emperor in Beijing to the lowly duckherd 
in the Pearl River Delta - celebrated important life transitions with the same set of rites. They 
also shared essentially the same oral tradition, expressed in folktales, myths, and legends. Alas, 
in this lecture I do not have time to elaborate on this theme of shared oral tradition; I will 
concentrate instead on the domain of ritual. 
 
 
The Role of Ritual in the Construction of 'Chineseness' 
 
Let us begin with a question that is deceptively simple but devilishly complex once one begins to 
dig: what makes Chinese culture 'Chinese'? What, in other words, are the basic elements of the 
cultural equation that allowed some residents of that vast country to call themselves Chinese 
(han) and be accepted as such, while other peoples were labelled 'barbarian' (fan, or more 
politely xiaoshu minzu, minority peoples).4 The set of cultural attributes that made one Chinese 
appears to have had little to do with a shared creed or set of prescribed religious beliefs. There 
was never a unified clergy in China charged with the responsibility of dispensing truth, as in 
Christendom. The closest parallel to the Western church hierarchy in China was the imperial 
bureaucracy but Chinese officials were relatively few in number and were preoccupied with the 
practical aspects of governance, not religious beliefs. 
 
In examining the processes of cultural construction it is perhaps best to focus on the distinction 
between Han and non-Han. Most people ordinarily present this as a straight-forward dichotomy: 
one either is or is not Han. The key diagnostic feature here is whether  a set of people are 
10 CHINESE CULTURAL IDENTITY  
deemed to have wen, variously translated as civilization, learning, or elegance. In historical 
terms, however, the distinction between Han and non-Han was never so simple, particularly in 
the south (see Faure 1989:8-14 on Han/Yao interactions in Guangdong). Over the centuries 
whole populations, on the order of European states, have made the transformation from non-Han 
to Han (Eberhard 1982:105-47, Wiens 1954:130-226). More recently, in the wake of post-Mao 
reforms, certain groups that had been recognized as Han are seeking to reclaim - and, in the 
process, reconstruct - earlier non-Han identities (see e.g. Wu 1989). These labels, therefore, are 
purely cultural and are not racial or biological in any obvious sense. 
 
To be Chinese in this context meant that one played by the rules of the dominant culture. What, 
then, were the rules of the game? How did groups become Chinese and maintain their 
'Chineseness?' From the perspective of ordinary people, to be Chinese was to understand and 
accept the view that there was a correct way to live one's life. This was reflected most directly in 
the enactment of public rituals associated with the life cycle - namely the rites of birth, marriage, 
death, and ancestorhood. Correct performance of these rites was one clear and unambiguous 
method of distinguishing the civilized from the uncivilized or, when considering marginal 
peoples, the cooked from the uncooked.5 Put another way, practice rather than belief was what 
made one Chinese in the eyes of others. 
 
As an example of the principles involved one can cite the complex rituals surrounding death in 
China. Based on a survey of ethnographic evidence I have elsewhere concluded that the basic 
form of funeral rites is (or was) similar throughout the empire (Watson 1988). There were, of 
course, interesting regional variations but, in general, all Chinese performed the same sequence 
of ritual acts at funerals - from the poorest farmer to the emperor himself (see Rawski 1988b on 
imperial rites). This sequence of acts might be called the elementary structure of Chinese 
funerary ritual; the proper performance of the sequence distinguished civilized from uncivilized 
rites. 
 
 
Orthopraxy versus Orthodoxy in the Ritual Context 
 
Over my twenty-plus years of field research in Hong Kong and China, I have observed hundreds 
of rites associated with death. It has become obvious (to me, at least) that correct practice 
(orthopraxy) and not correct belief (orthodoxy) was paramount in the ritual arena. In my 
experience cynics, agnostics, and active nonbelievers participated in funeral rites along with 
those who professed strong faith in the efficacy of the acts. Those who would refuse to follow 
CHINESE CULTURAL IDENTITY 11 
accepted procedure were consciously isolating themselves from the community and, hence, 
withdrawing from the dominant culture. It is interesting in this regard that many Cantonese 
Christians managed to perform the rites according to accepted sequence, even though the 
oral/textual part of the funeral conformed to Christian expectations. 
 
By emphasizing orthopraxy, I do not mean to imply that beliefs are somehow irrelevant to the 
construction of 'Chineseness'. This is obviously not the case, and any anthropologist can talk for 
days about the belief system that underpins traditional rites. 
 
Important as these beliefs were, however, it was anxiety over the practice of the rites, in the 
correct sequence, that took precedence over discussions of meaning or symbolism in the 
everyday discourse of ordinary people. This does not mean that there was no variation in 
performance. As long as the acts were accomplished in the approved sequence, there was room 
for infinite variety in ritual expression. 
 
Herein lies the genius of the (pre-socialist) Chinese approach to cultural construction: the system 
allowed for a high degree of variation within an overarching structure of unity. The rites 
associated with the final disposal of the corpse constitute an excellent example of this principle 
(variation within unity). Once the sealed coffin is removed from the community in the accepted 
fashion (by a procession marking the last of the prescribed funeral acts), mourners are free to 
dispose of the corpse according to local custom. There was, in other words, no elementary 
structure of disposal that applied to China as a whole (i.e. funeral rites were carefully prescribed, 
burial rites were not). 
 
In Guangdong, Fukien, and Taiwan secondary burial - the storage of exhumed bones in pots - 
was common (see e.g. Ahern 1973:163-219, Ling 1955, Watson 1982). On numerous occasions I 
have witnessed northern cadres recoil in absolute horror when the purpose of Cantonese bone 
pots is explained to them. Until recently, northerners did things that revolted southerners, such as 
storing coffins above ground, sometimes for decades, awaiting an auspicious burial date (Ebrey 
n.d., Naquin 1988). 
 
Given their political centrality, it is surely significant that rites of disposal were never subject to 
renegotiation and modification in the pursuit of a unified cultural identity. The exclusion of 
burial rites from the roster of prescribed rituals can thus be seen as an implicit concession to 
ethnic and regional sensitivities. This may well have been the consequence of a conscious policy 
by imperial officials and educated elites, given that any attempt to control burial practices would 
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have been disastrously expensive and impossible to enforce - as communist authorities were to 
discover during the 1950s and 1960s. 
 
Following the standard funeral sequence, by contrast, did not challenge local elites who for 
centuries had verified territorial claims by 'placing' the remains of ancestors in the landscape (cf. 
Bloch 1971). As long as disposal was not affected, the funeral rites (which are performed inside 
the community) could easily be adapted to suit 'Chinese' norms. Those who chose not to perform 
funerals according to the standard procedure were marked as non-Han or, worse, dangerous 
sectarians. 
 
The Chinese cultural system thus allowed for the free expression of what outsiders might 
perceive to be chaotic local diversity. The domain of ritual, in particular, gave great scope to 
regional and sub-ethnic cultural displays. The system was so flexible that those who called 
themselves Chinese could have their cake and eat it too: they could participate in a unified 
culture while, at the same time, celebrating their local or regional distinctiveness. 
 
Imperial officials were, of course, intimately involved in the standardization of funerary ritual 
but it would never have been possible to impose a uniform structure of rites on a society of such 
vast size and complexity. More subtle means were required. There is good evidence that imperial 
officials were engaged in the promotion of a standardized set of funeral and mourning customs 
throughout the empire (see Ebrey 1986, Rawski 1988a); the same is true for marriage rites 
(Mann n.d., Naquin n.d.). Accepted norms were enshrined in manuals available in even the 
smallest towns of the realm. Given what we know about the distribution of power in late imperial 
China it is probable that local elites subscribed to the accepted customs and encouraged a kind of 
ritual orthopraxy in the communities under their control: they led by example. Unacceptable 
practices were gradually suppressed or modified to conform to centralized models (Watson 
1985; see also Naquin 1988:53-66 on the standardizing role of ritual specialists). 
 
This may have been the mechanism for the superimposition of a standard ritual structure but we 
know little about the process of acceptance. Is the standardization we now perceive a 
consequence of government-sponsored social engineering carried out over many centuries or 
was it the result of voluntary adoption by the general populace? Need we assume that these 
processes were mutually exclusive? 
 
It is obvious that there must have been strong incentives for people of all classes and regional 
backgrounds to cooperate in the cultural construction of a standardized set of rites. Much more 
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work needs to be done before we can answer these questions. What is clear, however, is that the 
preoccupation with ritual practice - rather than religious beliefs - made it possible for imperial 
authorities, local elites, and ordinary peasants to agree on the proper form for the conduct of key 
rituals. 
 
Thus, the process of becoming Chinese did not involve any kind of conversion to a received 
dogma; it did not require professions of belief in a creed or set of ideas. One became Chinese, in 
effect, by acting Chinese - by behaving like Chinese. Perhaps the clearest indicator that this 
cultural transformation had been accomplished was the performance of key rituals in the 
accepted manner. 
 
One can find the origins of what I take to be the unique (pre-socialist) Chinese approach to the 
construction of cultural identity as far back as the Confucian Analects, and perhaps earlier (see 
e.g. Chang 1983:101, 108; Keightley 1987:166). By many interpretations the central theme of 
Confucianism is harmony in thought and action; correct ideas follow from proper behavior (cf. 
Fingarette 1972). In this sense orthopraxy is primary to, and takes precedence over, orthodoxy. 
At the core of Confucian notions of order is the principle of li, defined by Benjamin Schwartz as 
'all those "objective" prescriptions of behavior, whether involving rite, ceremony, manners, or 
general deportment' (1985:67). The Confucian approach to li  is relevant to cultural construction: 
following correct form ensured that one was playing the game of culture by civilized rules and, 
in so doing, one reaffirmed one's 'Chineseness'. 
 
I do not wish to be misinterpreted: I am not saying that ordinary villagers were social 
automatons, rotely performing rituals over which they had no control and little understanding. 
Nor should they be seen as puppets dancing on strings of convention held by agents of the state. 
Stressing orthopraxy rather than orthodoxy had profound consequences for all social classes. It 
allowed China to attain a level of cultural integration that was never possible in other, large-scale 
agrarian societies. It was a brilliant achievement in the annals of world history. The processes of 
cultural construction outlined in this talk involved the active participation of all Chinese - not 
just scholar-bureaucrats but farmers, artisans, merchants, and workers. There is evidence, for 
instance, that imperial officials were forced to accept, adapt, and coopt ritual practices that first 
emerged among the peasantry (see e.g. Ebrey 1986:20-9). The standard Chinese funeral that one 
can still see in Taiwan, Hong Kong, and in rural areas of the PRC appears to be timeless but it is, 
in fact, an amalgamation of ancient and modern rites (Rawski 1988a). Ordinary people, such as 
the ancestors of my village friends who live in the New Territories, had as much to do with 
creating and promoting this amalgamation as anyone else in the realm, including the emperor 
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himself. 
 
 
Ritual Form and Cultural Identity in Socialist China  
 
As those who have followed developments in post-1949 China well know, traditional rituals of 
the sort I have just described were rigorously attacked by communist party officials during the 
late 1950s and the late 1960s (see e.g. MacInnis 1972:333-4, Parish and Whyte 1968:264-5). 
Funeral and burial rites were obvious targets of social engineering, especially in south China 
where activists objected to the 'feudal' implications of the ancestor worship cult. 
 
Besides attacking the foundation of traditional mortuary rites, communist authorities attempted 
to introduce a new set of socialist rituals, based roughly on Soviet models (Binns 1980:180, Lane 
1981). Although field research on this problem has yet to be done it would appear that these new 
rites have had most influence in the larger cities, among the professional classes. Frugal 
memorial services replace banquets and ostentatious mourning displays; eulogies extolling the 
deceased's contribution to the building of socialism are substituted for traditional religious 
observances. 
 
In the countryside, by contrast, there is considerable evidence6 that non-socialist funerals are still 
common and that, since approximately 1980, rural peoples have begun to invest heavily in 
mortuary rituals of all kinds. Martin Whyte (1988) has argued that there is a growing cultural 
gap between urban and rural lifestyles in post-Mao China, reflected most clearly in life crisis 
rituals. Whyte's research focused on funeral rites but his analysis could be applied equally well 
to wedding ritual (see e.g. Whyte 1977, 1979). He notes that urbanites, due partly to the 
exigencies of city living, have embraced state-sponsored models for funerals and burials. Rural 
peoples, by contrast, have been less willing to adopt socialist rites, especially those involving 
cremation and 'thrifty' mourning customs (Whyte 1988). 
 
Does the fact that China no longer has an agreed upon set of rites (to mark birth, marriage, 
elderhood, death, and ancestorhood) mean that it no longer has a unified culture? In the past, as I 
have argued, one of the central experiences of life that helped hold China together was the fact 
that people of all social stations - rich and poor, rural and urban, official and commoner - 
performed life crisis rituals according to the same basic form. The disappearance of a unified 
cultural tradition is something that concerns many Chinese, particularly of the older generation. 
The physical destruction of the 'four olds'7 during the Cultural Revolution is paralleled by an 
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erosion in knowledge about the past. 
 
 
The Construction of New Cultural Identities in China 
 
The bifurcation of culture into rural and urban forms may be part of a general trend toward the 
renegotiation of 'Chineseness' among 
people in the PRC. One wonders whether a new notion of collective identity, based on a new set 
of standardized rites and unifying symbols, will emerge from the old? 
 
It is possible to interpret the Cultural Revolution as a state-sponsored movement in that 
direction, shifting from an emphasis on outward behavior and practice to a central concern with 
inner beliefs and purity of thought. The political campaigns of that era were designed to break 
the traditional mold, in a shift from form to content. 'Redness', judged by inner conviction, was 
stressed above all else; Red Guards and other activists did not allow people to fall back on ritual 
form or standardized behavior. This new, revolutionary approach required public confession, 
conversion, and whole-hearted acceptance of Maoist doctrine. 
 
No one, in effect, knew how to act during the early years of the Cultural Revolution. Behavioral 
conventions and norms of public etiquette were not only challenged, those who adhered to the 
'old' forms were deemed to be ideologically deficient. 
 
The results of the Maoist preoccupation with orthodoxy are by now universally recognized: 
disruption, disintegration, and anomie on a massive scale. It would appear that the construction 
of a new cultural identity through the imposition of a centrally-controlled ideology was an 
unmitigated disaster for China. This, at least, is one way to read recent history. 
 
What dare one say about the post-Mao reform era? It would be a gross simplification of recent 
political developments to argue that the reforms of the late 1970s and 1980s constitute a total 
repudiation of Maoist doctrine, returning the society to a system based on performance rather 
than ideology. Admittedly, some of the public rhetoric emanating from Beijing does seem to 
echo such concerns. Deng Xiaoping himself set the tone of the reform era with his famous 
axiom: 'It doesn't matter whether a cat is black or white, as long as it catches mice'. 
 
Rural people interpreted this and other pronouncements as a sign that the ideological heat was 
off and that performance (read production) would henceforth be rewarded, irrespective of class 
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background or inner conviction. The much heralded campaign to 'Let a Few Lead the Many to 
Wealth' was also aimed primarily at rural peoples. In fact, it is safe to say that the post-Mao 
reforms have had the most economic impact in the countryside and that urbanites - save for a 
relatively small number of entrepreneurs and independent contractors - have been reduced to the 
role of disgruntled spectators. The resentment felt toward nouveau riche farmers has become a 
serious social problem in some regions, with urbanites freely commenting on the unfairness of 
economic policies. 
 
Meanwhile the cultural gap between rural and urban may be growing wider each year. To be 
'Chinese' no longer implies that one shares 
the same sense of cultural identity. The key symbols that helped hold China together (shared 
rites, folkloric traditions, a common notion of proper lifestyle) no longer have the same meaning 
that they once did. 
 
The fact that university students used what are essentially foreign (or international) symbols in 
their Tiananmen Square demonstrations (i.e. hunger strikes, slogan-bearing headbands, V for 
victory signs, a version of the Statue of Liberty) is revealing and significant. These 
internationalist forms of political expression have been incorporated into the urbanite culture that 
is emerging in China's central cities. Thus, in terms of the symbolic reconstruction of a new 
sense of cultural identity, the activists in the square and their supporters probably have more in 
common with their Chinese compatriots in Hong Kong, Taipei, and New York than they do with 
their remote kin in the rural districts of Anhwei and Guangdong. We have little idea, at this 
writing, how the new symbols of democracy have been interpreted in the countryside or in 
provincial towns. It does seem likely, however, that the 1989 spring movement to match 
economic reforms with political reforms is destined to have more influence on the creators of 
China's emerging urban subculture. What this means for the future of 'Chineseness' as a general 
construct remains to be seen. 
 
I would like to add a postscript on recent political developments: this talk began with the TV 
images of the Tiananmen demonstrations. The June massacre brought another set of political 
dramas to the world's media: the roundup of 'counterrevolutionaries', a sister turning in her 
'renegade' brother, memorial services for 'martyred' soldiers killed by dangerous 'thugs'. We are 
presented with one of the century's most blatant (and transparent) efforts by party officials to 
rewrite recent history. 
 
The crackdown appears (at this writing) to be concentrated in China's major urban centers. The 
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sense of despair that characterizes Chinese intellectual life can only get worse in the immediate 
future. (On this problem see Perry Link's interesting article, in the New York Review of Books, 
vol. 36, no. 11, 29 June 1989, pp. 38-41, written just prior to the military intervention.) 
 
Inevitably the massacre will have a profound effect on the current generation of educated youths 
and their attempts to reconstruct an acceptable notion of Chinese cultural identity. By mid-June 
1989, PRC students and visiting scholars of my acquaintance are asking themselves some deeply 
troubling questions: 'What kind of people are ruling our country?' 'How could this happen in the 
1980s, with the whole world watching?' One 21 year old student from Beijing told me during the 
week following the massacre: 'My friends and I have talked all night. We have concluded that 
this is not just a problem of one man or one party. The blame is more general. We think there is 
something fundamentally wrong with our society. Everything has to be changed, especially the 
mentality of the Chinese people. This will take at least 50 years, maybe 100 years.' 
 
The echo of voices from the May 4th era are all too obvious. Until the very day of the massacre 
many Chinese intellectuals were engaged in a movement to reexamine the foundations of 
Chinese cultural identity. The television epic, He Shang (River Elegy, lit. 'early death on the 
river'), is perhaps the best known product of this movement. It was shown on Chinese Central 
Television in June, 1988, and sparked a major controversy. The series builds on the Yellow 
River as a symbol of Chinese culture and history; the yellow waters are tyrannical and 
unpredictable, both life-giving and life-destroying. The river never changes and yet is always 
changing. To many Chinese the message of the film was clear: only by rejecting the past and 
rebuilding a new political culture can China hope to enter the modern world. 
 
It is significant that the principal writer of He Shang, Su Xiaokang, was included on the 23 June 
1989 list of seven top intellectuals wanted by the state for 'counter-revolutionary crimes'. The 
authorities were sending a clear message by this act: henceforth, the Communist Party intends to 
control the redefinition of Chinese cultural identity. This is too important a matter to be left to 
'unreliable' intellectuals and ordinary people. 
 
So what is the party propaganda machine promoting? Lei Feng, yet again! The utter futility of 
this approach defies description. The future of 'Chineseness' in the twenty-first century most 
certainly does not lie with Lei Feng, or any of the other socialist models on display in the 
Chinese media. The current ice age in Chinese intellectual and cultural life is not likely to last 
long. Soon China will experience a burst of creativity and optimism, followed (one hopes) by a 
renewed tone of confidence and a rejuvenated sense of cultural identity that has meaning in the 
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modern world. 
 
Thank you. 
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Notes 
 
*. This lecture draws on material first presented in a conference paper and published in 
Perspectives on Modern China: Four Anniversaries, edited by Kenneth Lieberthal et al., M. E. 
Sharpe, 1991. The paper is reprinted in Popular Protest and Political Culture in Modern China: 
Learning from 1989, edited by J. N. Wasserstrom and B. J. Perry, Westview Press, 1991. 
 
1.  K. C. Chang and Hao Chang discussed the historical background of Chinese fasting with 
me and provided the above information.  
 
2.  The construction of culture approach is, by now, one of the dominant themes in 
American anthropology; it draws on the work of Clifford Geertz (1980), Marshall Sahlins 
(1976), David Schneider (1980), and a host of others who emphasize the creative rather than the 
passive aspects of culture. 
 
3.  DeFrancis (1984:201) has debunked this argument and attacks the whole notion that 
Chinese script is ideographic and non-phonetic. His approach, however, is not generally 
accepted. 
 
4.  In recent decades central authorities have discouraged the use of terms such as barbarian 
(fan) and uncivilized (meiwenhuade, wei kaihuade, yehmande) when speaking of non-Han. 
Nonetheless one still hears these terms in Taiwan and in many parts of the People's Republic. 
 
5.  The metaphor of cooking is frequently employed by ordinary Chinese when discussing 
non-Han communities (see e.g. Nequin and Rawski 1987:127-8). The dichotomy between 
'cooked' and 'uncooked' is still common in today's Taiwan and is used to designate the degree to 
which Taiwan's original inhabitants have been assimilated into Han culture.  
 
6.  Based on ethnographic surveys conducted by the author in Guangdong, Jiangsu, and 
Shandong (1985-91); see also Parish and Whyte (1978:265-6) and Jankowiak (1988). Myron 
Cohen (personal communication) reports that late imperial style funerals were still performed in 
rural Hebei during his recent field research (1986-7). David Wu (personal communication) 
observed a traditional funeral, complete with full mourning garb, in Zhejiang, in summer 1987. 
 
7.  Old thought, old customs, old culture, and old morals. During the Cultural Revolution, 
Red Guards destroyed many historical monuments, including graves and tombs (see e.g. Chan 
1984:118, Gao 1987:218). 
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